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Robust Resilient Signal Reconstruction under Adversarial Attacks
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We consider the problem of signal reconstruction for a system under sparse unbounded signal corruption by an adversarial agent.
The reconstruction problem follows the standard error coding problem that has been studied extensively in literature, with the
added consideration of support estimation of the attack vector. The problem is formulated as a constrained optimization problem –
merging exciting developments in the field of machine learning and estimation theory. Sufficient conditions for the reconstructability
and the associated reconstruction error bounds were obtained for both exact and inexact support estimation of the attack vector.
Special cases of data-driven model and linear dynamical systems were also considered.
Index Terms—Compressive Sensing, Signal Reconstruction, Cyber-physical Systems, Secure Estimation, Resilient.
I. INTRODUCTION
MAJORITY of Industrial systems and critical infras-tructures are Cyber-physical Systems (CPS), in that
they consist of an interplay between physical components
(sensors, controllers and actuators) and digital components
(computational algorithms, software systems, human-machine
interfaces) via communication networks. This opens up a
portal that makes them prime targets of cyber malicious
activities. The resilient signal reconstruction is a filtering
problem for removing undesirable effects created by malicious
intent as in adversarial attacks or other similar unbounded
phenomenon on some of the system’s monitoring nodes. For
physical systems, if signal reconstruction is performed jointly
on all the affected signals, then it can improve resiliency
of critical infrastructure to cyber-activities and fault-induced
anomalies to allow continued, safe operation [1].
There are numerous work in literature on the secure esti-
mation for CPS [2]–[11]. However, we focus only on the ones
which are optimization based - since that is the approach taken
in this work. Moreover, due to sparsity assumption on the set
of attacked nodes, majority of these works are based on the
classical error correction problem [12]. Given a coding matrix
F ∈ Rn×m with far fewer rows than columns (n ≪ m) and
a vector of observed/measured quantities y ∈ Rm, the coding
problem is to recover a sparse vector e, ‖e‖l0 < m for which
y = Fe. This is cast as the compressive sensing problem:
Minimize:
e
‖e‖l0 Subject to: y = Fe. (1)
Hayden et. al [13] obtained a sufficient condition that if
all subsets of 2q columns of F are full rank, then any error
‖e‖l0 ≤ q can be reconstructed uniquely by the solution of
the optimization problem in (1).
Although in some cases [6] the optimization problem in
(1) is solved as is, in most cases, it does not lend itself to
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a solution in polynomial time due to its nonconvexity. As a
result, it is often replaced with its convex neighbor:
Minimize:
e
‖e‖l1 Subject to: y = Fe. (2)
The two programs, however, have been shown to be equiva-
lent under the condition that the Restricted Isometric Property
(RIP) holds [14]–[17]. Let F T ,
((
F⊤
)
T
)⊤
∈ Rn×|T |, T ,
supp(e) ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} be the submatrix obtained by extracting
the columns of F corresponding to the indices in T . Then
the S-restricted isometry constant δS of F is defined as the
smallest quantity such that
(1− δS) ‖v‖
2
≤
∥∥F TSv∥∥2 ≤ (1 + δS) ‖v‖2
for all subsets TS with |TS | ≤ S and vector v ∈ R
|TS|.
This property essentially requires that every set of columns
with cardinality less than S approximately behaves like an
orthonormal system. Moreover, it was shown that if
δS + δ2S + δ3S < 1,
then solving the optimization problem in (2) recovers any
sparse signal e for which |T | ≤ S.
Now, suppose there is exists an oracle which estimates the
support T in advance, then the sparse vector e can estimated
to an accuracy of ε1−δ|T |
by the least square estimator:
eˆ = argmin
e
{
‖yT − FT e‖
2
}
,
where ε is the model-measurement error. Of course, if the
measurement is error-free, then the estimation is exact.
The goal of this work is to investigate least-square-type
estimator when such oracle is available subject to both
oracle and measurement uncertainties. Such oracles are
termed localization oracles for the purpose of this work.
The motivation for this approach stemmed from the authors’
experience from working on the DOE funded program
Cyber Attack Detection and Accommodation for Energy Delivery systems
where a team of Machine Learning experts have developed
such algorithm using supporting data from other sources. The
question then arises “What is the best simplest thing to do
to reconstruct true signals given localization information with
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uncertainty?”. This work is an attempt to provide an answer
partially to that question.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section III,
the measurement model considered is presented with the
basic reconstruction problem. In Section IV, some achievable
bounds are proved for the reconstruction problem where the
exact support of the attack vector is assumed to be provided
apriori by some support estimator. In Section V, the exact
support knowledge assumption is replaced by an uncertainty
model derived from the ROC statistic of the support estimator
and new results are obtained based on the statistical informa-
tion. Special cases of data-driven model and linear dynamical
systems were considered in Section VI. Finally, some future
directions are highlighted in Section VII
II. NOTATION
The following notions and conventions are employed
throughout the paper: R,Rn,Rn×m denote the space of real
numbers, real vectors of length n and real matrices of n
rows and m columns respectively. R+ denotes positive real
numbers. X⊤ denotes the transpose of the quantity X . By
Q  0, it is meant that Q is a positive semi-definite symmetric
matrix, i.e x⊤Qx ≥ 0 ∀x 6= 0 and Q ≻ 0 denotes positive
definiteness which is defined with strict > instead. Given
Q ≻ 0, the Q-weighted norm is defined as ‖x‖Q , x
⊤Qx.
Normal-face lower-case letters (x ∈ R) are used to represent
real scalars, bold-face lower-case letter (x ∈ Rn) represents
vectors, while normal-face upper case (X ∈ Rn×m) represents
matrices. Let T ⊆ {1, . . . , n} then, for a matrix X ∈ Rn×m,
XT ∈ R
|T |×m is the submatrix obtained by extracting the
rows of X corresponding to the indices in T . For a vector
x, xi denotes its ith element. The symbol ◦ denotes element-
wise multiplication of two vectors and is defined as z = x◦y,
where zi = xiyi. supp(x) is the support of the vector x
given by the set supp(x) = {i|xi 6= 0}. argsort ↓ (x)
denotes a function that returns the sorted indices of vector
x in descending order ( i.e argsort ↓ (x) = {i|xi ≥ xi+1}) .
Sc denotes the complement of a set and the universal set on
which it is defined will be clear from the context.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Consider the linear model:
y = Cx+ e+ v, (3)
where y, e,v ∈ Rm are vectors of observation/measurements,
attack/corruption due to an adversarial agent, and error term
due to measurement noise/model uncertainty respectively. The
matrix C ∈ Rm×n a mapping from some internal state (⊆ Rn)
to the output space (⊆ Rm). The following assumptions are
made with respect to the model above:
Assumptions
• Redundancy: Measurements contain redundant informa-
tion in that m > n
• Bounded Noise: There exists a known ε > 0 such that
‖v‖ ≤ ε
• Sparse Corruption: |supp(e)| ≪ m
• Attack-Noise Orthogonality: WLOG, e⊤v = 0
Consequently, the reconstruction problem is given by:
Minimize: ‖e‖l0 + ‖v‖l2
Subject to:
y = Cx+ e+ v
e⊤v = 0
(4)
which is, in general, a very challenging problem to solve
due to the index minimization objective and the degeneracy
introduced by the complementarity constraint e⊤v = 0.
However, if there exists a localization oracle that provides the
support T = supp(e) apriori, then the reconstruction problem
reduces to the unconstrained problem:
Minimize: ‖yT c − CT cx‖l2 . (5)
Of course, there are obvious conditions under which the
solution to the above optimization problem provides no guar-
antee of reconstructing the actual signal. In what follows, the
reconstruction error bounds are studied in more details under
different conditions.
IV. RECONSTRUCTION WITH EXACT SUPPORT
KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we examine some bounds on the reconstruc-
tion error when the attack support is known exactly. Although,
the exact knowledge assumption is not pragmatic, it does give
us a lower bound and a benchmark for the cases where the
support is not known exactly. The following theorem examines
the performance of a least-square reconstruction from partial
information.
Theorem 1 (Least Square Reconstruction). Given the linear
model
y = Cx+ ν, (6)
where y ∈ Rm is a vector of measurements, x ∈ Rn, n ≤ m
is a vector of internal states (or features), C ∈ Rm×n, and ν
is the model error with the associated error bound ‖ν‖ ≤ ε
for a known constant ε > 0.
Consider any partial measurement yT c ∈ R
m1 ,m1 < n
satisfying
yT c = CT cx
∗ + νT c , (7)
where νT c is the associated model error and the vector
x∗ ∈ Rn is the unknown actual internal state associated with
the complete measurement set as in (6).
The least-square estimator;
xˆ = argmin
{
1
2
‖yT c − CT cx‖
2
}
, (8)
of x∗, satisfies the error bound
‖xˆ− x∗‖ ≤
2
σ
ε, (9)
where σ is the smallest singular value of CT c .
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Proof. By the optimality of xˆ, it follows that
‖yT c − CT c xˆ‖
2 ≤ ‖yT c − CT cx
∗‖2 . (10)
After using (7), the above inequality can be simplified and
expanded as follows:
‖CT cx
∗ − CT c xˆ+ νT c‖
2
≤ ‖νT c‖
2
⇒‖CT c x˜‖
2
≤ 2ν⊤T c (CT c x˜) , (11)
where x˜ = xˆ− x∗. After using Young’s Inequality, for some
δ > 1 the above inequality yields1,
‖CT c x˜‖
2
≤ δ ‖νT c‖
2
+
1
δ
‖CT c x˜‖
2
,
⇒
(
1−
1
δ
)
‖CT c x˜‖
2
≤ δ ‖νT c‖
2
⇒‖CT c x˜‖
2 ≤ 4 ‖νT c‖
2 ≤
δ2
δ − 1
‖νT c‖
2
. (12)
From which we conclude that
‖x˜‖ ≤
2
σ
‖ν‖ ≤
2
σ
ε (13)
Remark 1 (Rank-deficiency and RIP). Necessarily |T c| >=
n, otherwise the reconstruction error ‖xˆ− x∗‖ is unbounded.
Consequently, one can conclude that: ‖xˆ− x∗‖ ≤ 21−δn ε,
where δn is the n-restricted isometry constant of C
⊤.
Although it was shown in [12] that random matrices satisfy
the RIP condition with overwhelming probability, certifying
such property is still an NP-hard problem [18]. In order to
guarantee bounded reconstruction error for the cases where
there are potential loss of row-rank after selection due to
the localization oracle, we investigate the use of a special
constraint in the reconstruction optimization problem.
Corollary 1 (Constrained Least Square Reconstruction). Let
X ⊂ Rn be a set characterized by ‖x1 − x2‖ ≤ δ for all
x1,x2 ∈ X and some δ > 0. Consider the constrained least-
square estimator:
xˆ = argmin
x∈X
{
1
2
‖yT c − CT cx‖
2
}
. (14)
If x∗ ∈ X , then the reconstruction error can be upper bounded
as:
‖xˆ− x∗‖ ≤ 2min
{
δ
2
,
ε
1− δn
}
. (15)
Proof. Using the optimality of xˆ and following similar ar-
gument as in the proof of Theorem 1, it is shown that
‖x− x∗‖ ≤ 2 ε1−δn . Next, using the feasibility of both x
and x∗, it follows that ‖x− x∗‖ ≤ δ. Thus, ‖xˆ− x∗‖ ≤
min
{
δ, 2 ε1−δn
}
.
Remark 2. Although Corollary 1 provides a guaranteed
bound on the reconstruction error, it introduces another
challenge of finding the set X that contains the unknown
vector x∗. Fortunately, there is a host of supervised and
1The same argument can be made for 0 < δ < 1 as well by using the
Young’s Inequality 2ν⊤
T c
(CT c x˜) ≤
1
δ
‖νT c‖
2 + δ ‖CT c x˜‖
2 instead.
unsupervised machine learning models and algorithms that
can be used to find such set from historical data, together
with some exogenous supporting measurement. In such cases,
the bound is guaranteed with a probability depending on
the ROC statistics of the underlying machine learning model.
Interested readers are directed to the reference [1] where the
authors used supervised learning with support vector machines
and generated a local approximation for X via a quadratic
approximation of the boundary score function.
V. RECONSTRUCTION WITH INEXACT SUPPORT
KNOWLEDGE
Even though, the constrained least square reconstruction
described in the previous section provides guaranteed bound
on the reconstruction error, it is impractical due to the ex-
act knowledge assumption on the support estimation. Exact
support knowledge alludes to a perfect localization oracle
which is not possible, or extremely challenging at best, from
a practical standpoint. Thus, it is imperative to understand
the effect of the imperfection of the localization oracle on
the reconstruction error bound. The goal of this section is to
re-examine the constrained least square reconstruction with
uncertain localization information.
For the unknown support T = supp(e), let the vector q be
an indicator of T c and defined element-wise as:
qi =
{
0 if i ∈ T
1 otherwise
(16)
Suppose the localization oracle gives an estimated support Tˆ ,
with qˆ similarly defined, the following uncertainty model is
used:
qi = ǫiqˆi + (1 − ǫi)(1 − qˆi) (17)
where ǫi is a Bernoulli random variable with mean pi whose
estimate is given by the true positive rate from the localization
ROC statistic. Each ǫi ∼ B(1,pi) captures the agreement
between the estimated and actual support as
ǫi =
{
1 ⇒ qˆi = qi
0 ⇒ qˆi = 1− qi
.
Consequently, the estimation error is characterized by
q˜i , qi − qˆi = (2qˆi − 1)(ǫi − 1). (18)
Clearly,
∑m
i=1 ǫi = m− |supp(q˜)| and is poisson-binomially
distributed. Let r ∈ Rm+1 be a vector whose elements
correspond to the probability mass function of
∑m
i=1 ǫi, i.e,
Pr
(
m∑
i=1
ǫi = k − 1
)
= rk, k = 1, . . .m+ 1,
then [19]
r = α
[
−s1
1
]
∗
[
−s2
1
]
∗ . . . ∗
[
−sm
1
]
, (19)
where
α =
m∏
i=1
pi, si = −
1− pi
pi
(20)
DRAFT: RSR, JAN 2018 4
and the symbol ∗ denotes the convolution operator for vectors.
Next, we seek the maximum integer lη ∈ {0, . . . ,m} for
which the oracle will correctly localize at least lη nodes with
a probability of at least η. Explicitly, lη is given by:
lη = max
{
k
∣∣∣∣∣Pr
(
m∑
i=1
ǫi ≥ k
)
≥ η
}
(21)
= max
{
k
∣∣∣∣∣1−
k+1∑
i=1
ri ≥ η
}
= max
{
k
∣∣∣∣∣
k+1∑
i=1
ri ≤ 1− η
}
, (22)
where η ∈ (0, 1] is a reliability level and is set apriori.
Theorem 2. Consider the linear measurement model given in
(3). Suppose there exists a localization oracle which gives an
estimate, Tˆ , of supp(e) with uncertainty described by (17).
Given a reliability level η ∈ (0, 1] with corresponding integer
lη given by (22), let Tˆη be a new support with the indicator qˆη
(of Tˆ cη ) obtained by randomly matching lη elements of qˆ while
setting the remaining elements to 0. If lη−|supp(e)| ≥ n then,
with a probability of at least η, the least-square estimator;
xˆη = argmin
x∈X
{
1
2
∥∥∥yTˆ cη − CTˆ cη x∥∥∥2
}
, (23)
satisfies the error bound
‖xˆη − x
∗‖ ≤ 2min
{
δ
2
,
ε
1− δn
}
, (24)
where δn is the n-restricted isometry constant of C
⊤ and x∗ ∈
R
n is the unknown true internal state.
Proof. To avoid repetition, we state upfront that all claims
made in this proof holds with a probability of at least η.
From the definition of lη in (21), it follows that Tˆ
c
η ⊆
{supp(e)}c, which implies that
∥∥∥yTˆ cη − CTˆ cη x∗∥∥∥ ≤ ε. Us-
ing the optimality of the estimator and following the same
procedure as in the proof of Theorem 1 yields
‖xˆη − x
∗‖ ≤ 2min
{
δ
2
,
ε
ση
}
,
where ση is the smallest singular value of CTˆ cη
. Next, since
ˆ|Tη| ≤ ˆ|T | and at least lη nodes are correctly localized by Tˆ ,
the following hold:
lη −
∣∣∣Tˆ cη ∣∣∣ = lη − (m− ∣∣∣Tˆη∣∣∣)
≤ lη −
(
m−
∣∣∣Tˆ ∣∣∣)
= lη −
∣∣∣Tˆ c∣∣∣
≤ supp (e) .
Using lη − |supp(e)| ≥ n, it follows that:
lη −
∣∣∣Tˆ cη ∣∣∣ ≤ lη − n,
which implies that
∣∣∣Tˆ cη ∣∣∣ ≥ n. Thus ση can be lower bounded
as ση ≥ (1− δn), from which the result follows.
Remark 3. Although the above theorem gives a recipe for
constructing a robust support from Tˆ , other heuristics can be
developed to obtain a more reliable robust support for the re-
construction optimization objective. For example, rather than
randomly matching lη elements of qˆ, we retain the localization
output for the first lη most trusted nodes. Suppose s ∈ [0, 1]
m
is a vector of confidence values2 for the localization output for
each node, then a robust support can be given by:
Tˆ cη =
{
Tˆ ∩ {argsort ↓ (p ◦ s)}
lη
1
}c
(25)
VI. CASE STUDIES
A. Data Driven Model
Suppose, instead of the linear model in (6), one only has
available the synchronous data tuple {σi,yi}, i = 1, . . .Nd,
where yi ∈ R
m are measurements collected from the process
of interest and σi ∈ R
nσ are associated vectors of exoge-
nous monitoring variables3. Let f(.; θ) : Rnσ 7→ Rm be a
parametrized nonlinear mapping with parameter θ selected to
minimize the empirical loss function:
J(θ) =
1
Nd
Nd∑
i=1
‖yi − f(σi; θ)‖
2
. (26)
If Nd is big enough, the residual {yi − f(σi; θ
∗)} can be as-
sumed to be unbiased. Thus, a linear model of the uncertainty
can be obtained by a subspace reduction on the residual data.
This can be obtained for instance by performing a Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) dimensionality reduction on the
error covariance matrix
E =
1
Nd
Nd∑
i=1
(yi − f(σi; θ
∗)) (yi − f(σi; θ
∗))
⊤
.
Let Φ ∈ Rm×n, n < m be a matrix whose columns correspond
to the first principal vectors of E. Then the data driven linear
model of the process to be used for resilient reconstruction is
given by
y = f(σ; θ∗) + Φx+ ν + e, (27)
with the model error bound ‖ν‖ ≤ O(sn+1), where sk is the
kth singular value of E.
Thus, given T = supp(e) with |T | >= n and T c ,
{1, . . . ,m}\T , the reconstruction is obtained as follows:
xˆ = argmin
x∈X
‖yT c − f(σ; θ
∗)T c − ΦT cx‖
2
yˆT c = yT c
yˆT = f(σ; θ
∗)T − ΦT c xˆ
(28)
with the reconstruction error given by Corollary 1 ( or Theo-
rem 2 if T is replaced with Tˆη).
2In most Machine Learning classification decision, it is possible to return
an associated confidence value by calculating a normalized distance from the
boundary.
3These are supporting source of measurement which are assumed to be
secure. Examples of such include; ambient conditions, external vibration
measurements, thermal images, network login information, etc
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B. Linear Dynamical System
Next, we turn our attention to discrete linear time-invariant
(LTI) systems which have been studied quite extensively in
literature with respect to resilient estimation. First, we recap
some results and then build on top of them using materials
from previous sections.
Consider the discrete LTI system
xk+1 = Axk (29)
yk = Cxk + ek, (30)
where xk ∈ R
n represents the state of the system at time
k ∈ N, yk ∈ R
m is the output of the monitoring nodes at time
k and ek ∈ R
m denote the attack signals injected by malicious
agents at the monitoring nodes. Let T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,m} denote
the set of attacked nodes, then for all k, |supp(ek)| ⊂ T . The
resilient estimation problem is then defined as reconstructing
the initial state x0 from corrupt measurement {yk}
T
k=0 , T ∈
N. We look at two scenarios from literature: T is time-invariant
[2], [3] and T is time-varying [5].
1) Secure estimation for Fixed Attacked Nodes [2]
Assuming that the set T of attacked nodes is time-invariant:
Definition 1. q errors are correctable after T steps by the
decoder D : (Rm)
T
7→ Rn if for any x0 ∈ R
n, any
T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with |T | ≤ q, and any sequence of
vectors e0, . . . , eT−1 ∈ R
m such that supp(ek) ⊂ T , we
have D(y0, . . . ,yT−1) = x0, where yk = CA
kx0 + ek for
k = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
Proposition 1. Let T ∈ N\{0}. The following are equivalent:
(i) There is a decoder that can correct q errors after T steps;
(ii) For all z ∈ Rn\{0}, |supp(Cz) ∪ supp(CAz) ∪ · · · ∪
supp(CAT−1z)| > 2q.
Consequently, the following optimal decoder is defined for
when the set of attacked nodes is fixed:
x0 = argmin
x
‖YT − ΦT (x)‖l0 (31)
where
YT =
[
y0 y1 . . . yT−1
]
∈ Rm×T
and ΦT : R
n 7→ Rm×T is a linear map given by:
ΦT (x) =
[
Cx CAx . . . CAT−1x
]
∈ Rm×T .
2) Secure estimation for Varying Attacked Nodes [5]
Assuming that the set T of attacked nodes can change with
time but bounded as in |T | ≤ q:
Definition 2. q errors are correctable after T steps by the de-
coder D : (Rm)
T
7→ Rn if for any x0 ∈ R
n and any sequence
of vectors e0, . . . , eT−1 ∈ R
m such that |supp(ek)| ≤ q, we
have D(y0, . . . ,yT−1) = x0, where yk = CA
kx0 + ek for
k = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
Proposition 2. Let T ∈ N\{0}. The following are equivalent:
(i) There is a decoder that can correct q errors after T steps;
(ii) For all z ∈ Rn\{0} ,
T−1∑
k=0
∣∣supp(CAkz)∣∣ > 2q.
Consequently, the following optimal decoder is defined for
when the set of attacked nodes is not fixed:
x0 = argmin
x
∥∥y(T ) − Φ(T )x∥∥l0 (32)
where
y(T ) =

y0
y1
...
yT−1
 ∈ RmT ,
Φ(T ) =

C
CA
...
CAT−1
 ∈ RmT×n.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that the set
T of attacked nodes can change with time but bounded as in
|T | ≤ q. Interested readers are referred to the reference [5] for
detailed discussion of the advantage of this assumption over
more traditional assumption of fixed set of attacked nodes.
3) Featurization of Observability Matrix
Given an integer ng ≤ n, consider the singular value
decomposition of the observability matrix in (32) given by:
Φ(T ) =
[
U1 U2
] [ Σ1
Σ2
] [
V ⊤1
V ⊤2
]
= U1Σ1V
⊤
1 + U2Σ2V
⊤
2 , (33)
where U1 ∈ R
mT×ng , U2 ∈ R
mT×(n−ng), Σ1 ∈ R
ng×ng
and U2 ∈ R
(n−ng)×(n−ng). We define the PCA feature
corresponding to the actual set of measurement y∗(T ) as the
linear transformation
g , Σ1V
⊤
1 x0 = U
⊤
1 y
∗
(T ), (34)
which results in the measurement model
y(T ) = U1g + e+ v, (35)
with ‖v‖ ≤ σ¯ng+1 ‖x0‖ and g ∈ G, where the set G is
characterized by ‖g1 − g2‖ ≤ δ for all g1,g2 ∈ G and σ¯i
is the ith biggest singular value of Φ(T ).
As will be seen later, using the feature measurement model
in (35) for resilient estimation creates a tradeoff between
reconstructability4 and reconstruction error.
It is also possible to use a more general nonlinear feature
transform of the form g = ψ(y(T )), ψ(.) : R
mT 7→ Rng .
This introduce additional challenge of computing the inverse
function ψ−1(.) : Rng 7→ RmT which is not straightforward
in general. However, since the scope of the present paper
is limited to linear systems, the linear feature transform
above turns out to be sufficient for the current work and
the consideration of nonlinear feature transform for nonlinear
systems is reserved for future work.
4defined as the total number of measurements that can be accurately
reconstructed by a resilient estimator
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4) Robust Resilient Reconstruction
The robust resilient estimator using the feature measurement
model in (35) is given by:
gˆk = argmin
‖g−gˆk−1‖≤δ
∥∥∥y(k)Tˆ cη (k) − U1Tˆ cη (k)g∥∥∥2
xˆ0 = V1Σ
−1
1 gˆk
(36)
where
y(k) =

yk−T
yk−T+1
...
yk−1
 ∈ RmT ,
and Tˆη(k) is the robust support estimate , with a reliability
level η, at time k.
Theorem 3. Suppose a localization oracle, with a true positive
rate pi for each node i, gives an estimated support Tˆ .
Let Tˆη(k) be given as described in Theorem 2 (or (25)).
If lη − q ≥ ng then, with a probability of at least η, q
errors are correctable by the resilient estimator given in (36).
Furthermore, the estimation error is bounded as:
‖xˆ0 − x0‖ ≤
δ
σ¯ng
min
{
1,
σ¯ng+1
1− δng
}
. (37)
Proof. The result follows by following the same procedure in
the proof of Theorem 2 using the measurement model in (35)
and noting that
‖v‖ ≤ σ¯ng+1 ‖x0‖ = σ¯ng+1
∥∥V1Σ−11 g∥∥
≤
σ¯ng+1
σ¯ng
δ.
Remark 4. The size ng of the feature vector g creates a
tradeoff between reconstructability and reconstruction error
bound in that the maximum number of correctable error
qmax = max{q ∈ Z|q ≤ lη − ng} decreases with ng while
the error bound improves (1− δng increases) with ng .
VII. CONCLUSION
The problem of reconstructing compromised signals for a
cyber-physical system under adversarial attack is considered.
The approach merges results from machine learning an es-
timation theory to produce and optimization-based resilient
estimator. It was shown that, under certain conditions, the
signals can be reconstructed even with uncertain estimation of
the support of the attack vector. The basic result was applied to
two special cases; data-driven model and linear time-invariant
system.
Finally, we highlight some open problems for future work.
There is need to validate the theoretical claims via numerical
simulation and experimental setup. Extension of the results
to nonlinear systems via nonlinear feature transform is an
open problem and reserved for future work. The constraint in
the reconstruction optimization problem is a simple quadratic
constraint. In future, we plan to consider more complicated
boundary function. The overall problem is set up for an open-
loop scenario. It remains an open question what kind of effects
would be expected if the resilient estimator is cascaded with
a controller in a closed-loop setting. Also, only measurement
error is considered with the attack uncertainty in the measure-
ment model. It will be beneficial to see some results pertaining
to model uncertainties using popular uncertainty model like
integral quadratic constraints.
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